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Abstract. This paper comments on a number of social obstacles to the economic growth 
and technological change of African economies from the perspective of economic history. 
Economic history is full of evidence about what held African economies back for years. 
Some obstacles are of domestic origin such as excessive consumption and luxury 
masqueraded as public investment. Other obstacles were imposed from outside such as the 
destruction and weakening of traditional African religions and religious leadership as well 
as other wide ranging institutions. The combined effects can be summed up in one word: 
de-institutionalization. De-institutionalization devalued local knowledge (technology) 
thereby reducing performance. It is not possible to turn the clock back, but current policy is 
better-off bringing these obstacles into discussion as they stand a good chance of lowering 
the socalled “Africa dummy” variable common to growth regressions. Future research 
would also benefit if it sought to adjust conventional economic theory to allow space for the 
special features of African economies. Market theory is misleading in treating private use 
rights as antithetical to private ownership rights. For example, the suggestion that land 
tenure in Africa is anti-growth is inconsistent with the spectacular growth China has 
experienced even without private property rights. 
Keywords. Social obstacles, Growth and change, African economies, „Primitive‟ 
economies, African traditional economies. 
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1. Introduction 
he quote above should indicate that I am a convert to Sir W. Arthur Lewis‟s 
maxim that “old economists never die; they [only] become economic 
historians” (Caincross, 1996:ix). The conversion incidentally reveals my 
age, but more importantly it shows that age refocuses one‟s reading of history. 
Now I see in economic history enough evidence that early African civilizations 
were as advanced as other civilizations elsewhere in the world (Hull, 1976; 
Davidson, 1959; Rogers, 1947; Rogers, 1946; Johnson, 1974; Pakenham, 1991; 
Fagan, 2011).  The biblical notions of Africa as a dark place, and of Africans as 
cursed offsprings of Ham were products of incomprehensible ignorance and 
prejudice, some of which knowledge has begun to conquer with the passage of time 
(Shinnie, 1965).
2
 This is to be expected because „primitive‟ people everywhere 
were wise, but their knowledge was spatially limited. However, even with that 
limitation, we now know of strong Carthage-Africa trade dating to BC years, and 
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of extensive interactions between Africans on one hand, and the Romans, 
Phoenicians, and Vandals on the other hand (Rogers, 1946; 1947; Wells, 1961). 
Claims like Sigmund‟s (1972) that Africa‟s political, social thought and 
organization are recent developments are simply incorrect. They confirm that while 
modern people are knowledgeable, they often also tend to be unwise. For that 
reason I have come to think the fastest pace of human progress has happened at the 
intersection of wisdom and knowledge, but I have no intention to test that 
proposition. What I would say is that historical evidence leaves no doubt that 
obstacles like the Atlantic Slave Trade, colonization and colonialism, and 
economic and political imperialism arrested endogenous development of 
indigenous institutions with and without replacement (cf. Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2001; Thornton, 1998; Rodney, 1972; Boulding & Mukerjee, 1972).  
The effects are huge, see, e.g., Fosu (2012), Nunn (2008; 2012). 
Social obstacles to growth and change have not been peculiar to African 
countries. How and why their arrest have had longer-lasting effects on Africa than 
elsewhere is fundamental to the hypothesis one would need to construct in order to 
answer the question. But then again I intend to stay away from that too, reminded 
of the challenge that “the construction of hypotheses is a creative act of inspiration, 
intuition, invention; its essence is the vision of something new in familiar material, 
[and that] the process [of building hypotheses] must be discussed in psychological, 
not logical categories; studied in autobiographies and biographies, not treatises on 
scientific method; and promoted by maxim and example, not syllogism or 
theorem” (Friedman, 1953: 43). However, if I were to venture a maintained 
hypothesis I would say that the arrest of the development of indigenous institutions 
has lasted long because obstacles to fast progress of African countries first 
interrupted technology (knowledge), and thereby slowing down technological 
progress (Segal, 1987). Without technological change, organizational change is 
also constrained, economic growth checked and “things fell apart” (Scabrough & 
Corbett, 1992; Mabin, 1989).
3
 Without technological change, the spread within, 
and transfer without, of knowledge are severely constrained (Jovanovic & Nyarko, 
1995, cf. Reid, 2009). 
By technology I mean any knowledge that is capable of inducing socio-
economic change (Sowell, 1996; Szimai, 2005). Thus, I adopt, without providing 
further explanation, William F. Ogburn‟s (1957) list of the “different viewpoints 
toward technology”, i.e., technology is: “gadget and push buttons; destroyer of 
artistic skills; creator of technological unemployment; aid to non-industrial 
peoples; maker of wealth; materialization versus spiritualization [of human 
efforts]; machine the monster; a worker of miracles; a precipitator of change; a 
changing environment to which we [must] adjust; and creator of cultural lags” (pp. 
3-8, [] added). The preceding suggest that technology is a multidimensional agent 
of social change (cf.  Szirmai, 2005; Allison, 2002; Brose, 1998; Cottrell, 1972; 
Pytlik, Lauda & Johnson, 1985; Lustig-Arecco, 1975) as evident from nearly all 
prior writings on the subject ranging from K. Marx & F. Engels (1848:79-94) and 
on down.  For the inquisitve reader, social determinants of technical progress are 
subjects of Edwin Mansfield (1971), Nathan Rosenberg (1982), Rosenberg, 
Laundau, & Mowery (1992), Richard Nelson (1981; 1996), Douglas North (1990), 
and Dasgupta & Stoneman (1987) to mention just a few. In fact, Stewart & James 
(1982), Lall (1981), Fransman (1986), and others tell us that the understanding of 
technology as a social phenomenon has basis in Adam Smith‟s (1937, Book 1 
Chapters 1- 4, pp. 3-29) discussion of specialization and productivity.  
How is knowledge created in the first place? Well, Arrow (1962a; 1962b; 1969) 
has argued that knowledge creation is a learning-by-doing process that is not 
difficult as it is what people already do for a living as well as what happens 
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incidentally in the living process. Yaw Nyarko (2008) has dubbed this process 
experimental “problem-solving”, which every country must do for itself if it hopes 
to grow and change. The real problem is that knowledge creation suffers a two-part 
incentive problem. The first part stems from the uncertainty which drives a wedge 
between the market rate of return from knowledge creation and the higher expected 
rate of return from the same. The second part is what Fransman (1986:8) has called 
the “appropriability problem” arising from the fact that knowledge is, at least, a 
quasi-public resource. These two problems make the distribution of knowledge 
uneven and its pricing indeterminate, and hence complicate the transmission 
channels due to potential externalities and associated inefficiencies (Jovanovic & 
Nyarko, 1995). Such complications further affect local capabilities for creating and 
adjusting to local conditions knowledge created elsewhere. The debate on the 
appropriateness of knowledge, and subsequent social benefit/cost analyses reflect 
that concern (Martinussen, 1997; Sen, 1980; 1999; Schumacher, 1989[1973]; 
Adelman & Morris, 1971; Temple & Johnson, 1998).  
To understand the social foundation of technology from the perspective of 
economic history we need to study how historians view economic growth 
(Adelman, 1988; Jerven, 2011; Temin, 2014). Doing so is important because it re-
orients analysis. Currently economists are all Marxists in a way insofar as they 
often place the economy and economic activities at the center of human progress. 
Toynbee (1946), like most historians, argues that economic growth is a function of 
society (the macrocosm), the individual (the microcosm), and other forces. Among 
the individuals that have been critical to economic growth Toynbee has listed God, 
Saints, religious and political leaders, and “creative minorities”. In his own words, 
“growth is achieved when an individual or a minority or a whole society replies to 
a challenge by a response which not only answers that challenge but also exposes 
the respondent to a fresh challenge which demands a further response on his part” 
(p. 241). Similarly, the decline of civilizations is also determined by Nature, loss of 
control on the environment, and loss of self-determination (pp. 244-359). The pace 
of decline (disintegration of civilization) depends on social decay, resulting from 
the “schisms” of the “body social,” “soul,” and the interaction between the two (pp. 
360-566). Whereas God is rarely an explicit variable in present-day growth 
regressions, religion and religious leadership continue to hold the attention 
assigned to it by Max Weber‟s (1998[1905]) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, for instance. Nowadays, God has entered growth regressions only as 
Nature/nature (geography, climate, ethno-linguistics, etc) and as god-given 
influences like cultural differences (Malinowski, 1944).
4
 For example, Robert 
Barro (2003), David Brat (1996), Robin Grier (1997), Young (2009) have all tested 
the strength of religion or religious variables in economic performance with 
varying results. Although Amintore Fanfani (2003) agrees with Hicks (1969) that 
the emergence of exchange relations and the market preceded the rise of 
capitalism, he is convinced of the strong, positive and negative, effects of primitive 
Catholic and Protestant institutions on the progress of capitalism. 
In reading EAJ Johnson‟s (1965) chapter, “Everyman his own economist,” it is 
hard not to think how much present-day development economics in general and in 
Africa particularly is a throwback to the pre-Smithian economic localism strangely 
in a world that has become global. Unlike his predecessors, says Johnson, but “like 
all good architects [Adam] Smith did not rely wholly on naïve design or domestic 
materials; he surveyed the modes of building at home and abroad, using sound 
methods and good materials of both foreign and domestic origin. Scholar and 
builder that he was, he thought it proper not only to construct an adequate system 
but also to show where others had erred. His bitter criticism of the Mercantile 
System ought not to be regarded as evidence that he repudiated the work of all his 
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British predecessors. What he really censored was faulty work of the merchant-
authors, the most dogmatic and voluble, but least reflective of his British 
predecessors” (p. 10). Stated differently, Smith understood that “doctrinal 
genealogies are always flimsy and fragile, [and] they attain strength only when 
they are incorporated into the whole fabric of which they are but major threads” 
(pp. 10-11). As Arthur Schopenhauer (c.1910) came to restate the same idea later, 
individual threads are like wax which melts away when exposed to heat leading to 
the whole fabric to fall apart (cf. von der Wagon Brecht, 2007). Smith‟s approach 
is exactly the approach that has been missing in the study of knowledge 
(technology) and its implication for the progress of African countries. 
 
2. Obstacles to Technology, Technological Change, and the 
Progress of African countries 
I claim that the fastest pace of progress anywhere in the world has occurred at 
the intersection of wisdom and knowledge (technology). What slowed progress in 
African countries is the de-institutionalization of those countries. Loss and 
weakening of traditional (indigenously endogenous) institutions devalued and 
undervalued local knowledge, in some countries more than in others.  Following 
below are examples indicative of the de-institutionalization process. 
2.1. Loss of Traditional Religions and Religious Authorities 
Among all regions of the world, Africa has adopted most foreign religions, and 
this came with a high opportunity cost – de-institutionalization.5 As Toynbee 
(1946) indicated religion played an important role in economic growth of all 
civilizations. Max Weber thought of protestant religions as being central to “the 
spirit of capitalism.” On the other hand, Weber also argued that The Religions of 
the East (in three volumes, 1951; 1952; 1958) were not conducive to the economic 
growth and technological progress of the region. Ming-Yih Liang, Wen-Ying 
Wang & Bruce Yichun Hsueh (2005), Ming-Yih Liang (2010), and Ming-Yih 
Liang (2012) have illustrated that East Asian growth miracles are likely due to the 
Confucian ethic. Karl Marx concluded that all religion is “the opium of the people” 
which prevents “universal human emancipation” (Bender, 1986:21-23; 45-61).6 
However, although other religions are now common variables in growth 
regressions, traditional African religions have never been given their due place in 
such regressions, at least not that I am aware of. Many writers have suggested that 
African religions were banished to obscurity because they were, or were perceived 
to be, inconsistent with modernity (Mezzana, 2010; Gbanda, (undated), Ogunbado, 
2012). This claim is incomprehensible since as defined by Awolalu (1975) most 
African religions have had significant overlaps with Christianity, Islam, and 
Judaism (cf. Ogunade, (undated).
7
 
African countries also have not escaped the effects of religion-science debates. 
Theoreticallly science is based on reason and evidence; religion on faith and 
sacredness. However, as John Polkinghorne (1998) discusses the two have often 
interacted, although not always amicably.  The Catholic Church persecuted Galileo 
for espousing Copernicus ideas. Later the same opposition, albeit to a less severe 
extent, was expressed against Darwin for his theory of evolution through natural 
selection. In fact, the science-religion dichotomy continues to-date, even as it is 
abundantly clear now that both religious and nonreligious people have made 
important contributions to science. The U.S. National Academy of Sciences 
(USNAS) is on record about the compatible independence of science and religion 
and their respective roles in humanity.
8
 Albert Einstein (1941) also sees no 
contradiction between science and religion per se, but he notes that “a conflict 
arises when a religious community insists on the absolute truthfulness of all 
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statements recorded in the Bible, [because] this means an intervention on the part 
of religion into the sphere of science .... [Similarly] representatives of science have 
often made an attempt to arrive at fundamental judgments with respect to values 
and ends on the basis of scientific method, and in this way have set themselves in 
opposition to religion” (cf. Na, undated). Moreover, it is common knowledge that 
many scientists, including Nobel Prize winners, are religious, with an 
overwhelming majority of them being Christians.
9
 By contrast, traditional African 
religions were persecuted first by other religions and later by science, and the effect 
is the de-institutionalization of African economies. 
Again, while all these religion-science issues are nearly universal, African 
religions are among the few that have been forced out of existence or their growth 
and diffusion stunted. With such a decline ceremonies, deities, practices and 
rituals, and virtues and vices alike have weakened or disappeared. The weakening 
and disappearance of African religions undermined social norms and values upon 
which economic behavior, organization, and control depend (cf. Kornai, 1983; 
Amavilah, 2010). Moreover, the persecution did not just eliminate African 
religions; in many cases it replaced them with seemingly unscientific beliefs, 
practices, and rituals. For example, the idea of Santa Claus has no scientific basis. 
Catholics have been opposed to Halloween for years, but society is least bothered 
by the opposition. As with magic acts, while unscientific, Santa Claus and 
Halloween generate beneficial economic activities and technological changes, and 
are respected by many people.
10
In many places even traditional African weddings 
disappeared and there is no reason to doubt that such festivities would have had 
important economic impact as well. 
2.2. Loss of Traditional Economic Institutions 
Sir W. Arthur Lewis (1965) lists economic institutions second among the 
proximate causes of economic growth (cf. Amavilah, 2014a).
11
 In the chapter on 
“archaic economic institutions” of his book Dahomey and the Slave Trade: An 
Analysis of an Archaic Economy, Karl Polanyi (1966, cf. 1957[1944]) describes a 
highly sophisticated cowrie-based monetary system (cf. Dalton, 1965).  The 
invention made a huge, but unreconized, contribution to financial and banking 
technology. It was a harbinger of fiat money at the time when Europe and China 
focused on conventional commodity money. Archaic economies demonstrated 
beyond any reasonable doubt that an economy could run efficiently with money 
that did not have universal intrinsic face value. As money cowrie was the 
equivalent of paper money. However, cowrie money was ahead of paper money 
because it did not require government law to make it a legal tender. How it became 
that way, we‟ll most likely not understand given that the knowledge has long 
disappeared. What one gathers from Polanyi is that fiat money is really a 
technological invention by „primitive‟ economies (cf. Herskovits, 1952; 
Malinowski, 1921; 1961). 
In an informal conversation, a colleague has argued, and I paraphrase, that 
cowrie money can never be any improvement on paper money in any society or 
country. He insisted that cowrie money has intrinsic value just as gold and silver or 
copper which replaced it, but it has never been fiat money. Many „primitive‟ 
societies still use cowrie as decorative ornaments. Thus, while one can say cowrie 
money was not full-bodied commodity money, one cannot say it does not have any 
intrinsic value, because its value derives from its demand just like the value of 
gold, silver, and so on derives from demand. He concluded that cowrie money 
failed for the same reasons other commodity money failed; it did not have enduring 
basic characteristics and properties of money, and it could not improve accounting 
or promote efficiency of business transactions. Hence, he does not see the 
devastating consequences African countries incurred as a result of the destruction 
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of the cowrie-based monetary system as there is no evidence of bankruptcies 
resulting from loss of massive storage of cowries leading to cowrie bank panic and 
cowrie money market crashes.  
My friend‟s argument is incisive. However, I would say that cowrie money 
preceded, and coexisted in some places, with paper money, illustrating that 
sophisticated economic institutions and networks existed in African economies, 
and the cowrie-based monetary system in „primitive‟ West Africa is an excellent 
example. The example is not groundless; evidence clearly now shows that 
dysfuncrtional institutions, including financial institutions, are a part of the deep 
causes of the economic problems African countries have faced (Fosu, 2012; 
Bhattacharyya, 2009; Humphries & Bates, 2005; Goldsmith, 1998; Easterly & 
Levine, 1997; Stein, 1994; Andres, Asongu, & Amavilah, 2013). Just as clearly 
research continues to suggest that African economies that retained and were able to 
improve at least some of their traditional institutions, have done well relative to 
their counterparts who lost all or most of their traditional institutions and had to 
start from scratch. In Africa, Botswana and Mauritius are often singled out for the 
honor (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; 2002; cf. Amavilah, 2006). 
Regarding bankruptcies, things were actually worse than they appear; there was 
indeed a cowrie inflation. As the demand for gold/silver increased, the quantity 
“demanded” of cowrie fell to zero, and there was too much cowrie and nothing to 
spend it on – the cost of such inflation are now self-explanatory – de-
institutionalization. 
There is a growing line of research that documents the negative long-term 
effects of the de-institutionalization of African economies (Nunn, 2008; 2009; 
2012). The destruction of the cowrie-based monetary system offers a good 
example, not inasmuch as it was superior over the alternatives, but as in terms of 
what was lost. To appreciate my interpretation of Polanyi‟s Dahomey, one has to 
buy into my characterization of a monetary system. To me, a monetary system 
(MS) consists of (a) money (M) as its foundation, and (b) financial institutions (FI). 
Some financial institutions are private (FIP), and others are public (FIG), i.e., 
 
𝑀𝑆 = 𝑀 + 𝐹𝐼 = 𝑀 + (𝐹𝐼𝑃 + 𝐹𝐼𝐺)      (1) 
 
Now, let‟s designate the „primitive‟ economies by the number 1, such that for M 
= Cowrie  
 
𝑀𝑆1 = 𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑒 + 𝐹𝐼1 = 𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑒 + (𝐹𝐼𝑃1 + 𝐹𝐼𝐺1)   (2) 
 
The introduction of gold/silver as a replacement for cowrie destroyed (2) to  
 
𝑀𝑆2 = 𝐺𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟 +  𝐹𝐼𝑃2 + 𝐹𝐼𝐺2 , 𝐶𝑜𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑒 = 0   (3) 
 
The trouble started there – with (3).12 How? – note that while cowrie was a 
commodity, it was not commodity money in the economist‟s full definition of 
commodity money. For example, Samuelson & Nordhaus (1995) describe two sets 
of commodity money. The first set would include commodities like tally sticks, 
paper, beaver pelts, tobacco, cowrie, salt, Rai stones, alcohol (wine, beer, etc.), 
cigarettes, cannabis, candy, maize, barley, wampum, rice (koku), cattle, 
arrowheads, olive oil, and so on, depending on time and place. These “items have 
served as money at one time or another” (p. 480), but their universal “moneyness” 
was constrained by the fact that they had little or no universal intrinsic value. The 
second set of commodity money “had [high] intrinsic value, meaning that they had 
use value in themselves, [and] because [such] money had intrinsic value, there was 
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no need for government to guarantee its value, and the quantity of money was 
regulated by the market through the supply and demand for gold or silver” (p. 480, 
stress added) – resulting in a rather volatile and unpredictable value of money as it 
depended on market and technical conditions affecting the availability of the 
metals involved. In Africa’s case the switch from the first set of commodity money 
to the second was in fact a step backward as it later turned out.  First,  the cowrie-
to-gold/silver rate of exchange was either nonexistent, undefined, or outright 
indeterminate. Hence, full replacement of (2) by (3) just meant people needed 
gold/silver.
13
 In other words, the value of cowrie in circulation and whatever 
storage facilities (vaults) they had then suddenly became zero. This was a massive 
crash.
14
 Consequently where there were no gold/silver mines, or other cheap 
sources of gold/silver, the need for gold/silver fed directly into the slave trade. 
Polanyi (1966) has a schedule of the price of a woman slave on Page 152 of his 
book in terms of the exchange rates between a gold bar and a number of items 
(excluding cowrie). The schedule shows clearly that 50 gold bars were the price of 
a perfect woman slave, which was then adjusted if the slave was missing a tooth or 
limb, or whether she was old or young, plus profit margin. In monetary terms it 
appears an ounce of gold was valued at four British pounds, and 1000 cowrie was 
an equivalent of 2s.6d. So, a woman slave cost anywhere between 16,000 and 
32,000 cowrie. Of course, this is all speculative now; but just imagine what 
happened when all that cowrie money becomes worthless instantly. In fact, things 
cannot be any more devastating than that, because if you enslaved women, you 
destroy the family; destroying the family is destroying agriculture, and without 
agriculture the entire society suffers (Bell & Vogel, 1968; Gilman, 1966). Thus, the 
devastating effects were the loss of institutions, knowledge and confidence, all 
essential to innovations and other sources of knowledge growth (Amavilah, 2009). 
The devastation was wide because cowrie money was not fiat money in the 
simple economist‟s sense. Again economists define fiat money as “money because 
the government decrees it is money, and because we all accept it” (Samuelson, 
1970:259). N. Gregory Mankiw (2014) defines fiat money as “money without 
intrinsic value that is used as money because of government decree” (p. 220). 
Although later the monarch in Dahomey issued “separate currencies [that] operated 
in each of the neighboring countries of Dahomey, Ashanti, and Whydah” (Polanyi, 
1966:30), there were no political state units that made cowrie a generally accepted 
means of exchange. Modern fiat money is a legal tender in the jurisdiction that 
made it so. The use of cowrie was transboundary and trans-tribal, in fact 
transnational long before there were nations; no-one made it money by law – 
proving Samuelson (1997[1948]) correct that “money, as money rather than a 
commodity, is wanted not for its own sake but for things it will buy!”(p. 55).15 
Think of it: To-date the U.S. dollar is generally an accepted international currency, 
but other countries still are not obliged to accept it as a means of payment. From 
such angle the cowrie system was comparable only to the Euro, but without any 
political sanction behind it – it was far ahead of its times. 
While it is a reasonable argument that cowrie was replaced by gold/silver as 
better commodity money because the latter had a higher face value than the former, 
that argument was valid only as long as economies ran on valuable commodity 
money. The introduction of paper money by fiat was conceptually the re-
introduction of cowrie money. Thus, “archaic economies” recognized that 
economies could be run on the basis of money with far less intrinsic value than 
gold/silver, and without decree. The failure to credit primitive economies for this 
technological invention is a form of de-institutionalization (cf. Malinowski, 1944; 
1945). 
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I would also claim that the concept of a bank as a financial intermediary is not 
really modern. While cowrie was an accepted medium of exchange (it had value in 
exchange), value in use was in other things. George Dalton (1965) has written 
more authoritatively on primitive money than anyone else, but even Herskovits 
(1952) tells us that in some traditional African economies cattle, for example, 
played a role similar to that of a modern bank (cf. Herskovits & Harwitz, 1964). 
Essentially, cattle were a mobile house of value – mobile bank. Again, primitive 
people recognized that although it stored value well, cattle was not a good medium 
of exchange because it was indivisible, not easily portable, and hence a poor unit of 
account, a role cowrie filled well. The failure to acknowledge this sophisticated 
theory of value, explains why some economists still today do not understand while 
electronic mobile banking is spreading fastest in the traditionally cattle raising 
regions of Africa like Kenya. The missing part, to quote JJ Spengler‟s (1960) 
understanding of JS Mill, is that “noneconomic factors played an important role in 
human affairs, which involved economic progress. Among these factors he 
included beliefs, habits of thought, customs, and institutions” (p. 119). Today these 
same factors are all largely ignored in African economies, explaining the extant 
wedge between economic theory and practice. 
The critical reader might have objected all along to my discussion, because I 
superimposed modern exchange economies over traditional economies – I agree. 
As George Dalton (1965) tells us, economists are wrong in this superimposition. 
Here is one stinger Dalton threw at economists: “Economics textbooks (e.g., 
Samuelson 1961:54; Reynolds 1963:475) err in citing primitive monies 
indiscriminately as equivalents of Western media of (commercial) exchange .... By 
giving the impression that all primitive monies perform the same primary function 
as dollars, they quite wrongly imply that all primitive economies may be regarded 
as crude market economies” (p. 60, original italics). I know from their published 
works that both Samuelson and Reynolds were not dogmatists, but I did not 
examine recent editions of their textbooks to ascertain whether either or both have 
responded to Dalton‟s charge.  However, we all know that there is a tendency to 
think that money is money, primitive or modern. While the commercial functions 
of money are the same across different economies, “where economies are 
organized differently, non-commercial uses of monetary objects become important, 
and “money” takes on different characteristics” (p. 45). In market economies “all 
the commercial uses of money are consequences of market integration, simply 
reflecting the highly organized credit and accounting arrangements that facilitate 
market purchase, [and non-commercial purchases can easily be monetized], but for 
primitive communities where market transactions are absent or infrequent, it would 
be distorting to identify money with medium of [commercial) exchange” alone (p. 
47). Clearly “primitive money-stuff [money used in non-commercial transactions] 
does not have that bundle of related uses which our economy is conferred on 
dollars by market integration and by the use of dollars in both commercial and 
non-commercial transactions” (p. 50, original emphasis, [...] added).  For example, 
while acceptable to use cowrie to buy a fish, a cow would be a more appropriate 
reciprocal gift for a bride. To convert the value of a cow into cowrie equivalent is 
inconsistent with the structure and function of the economy (Ashraf, Bau, Nunn, & 
Voena, 2014).
16
 Dalton‟s four types of economies (marketless economy, peripheral 
market economy, market-dominated (peasant) economy, and “large-scale, 
developed, internally integrated economy”) are illustrative here. If these features 
were a part of modern economic theory, economics would have been richer and 
more equipped to deal effectively with a host of problems facing developing 
countries than it is now.
17 
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2.3. Confusing Private Use Rights and Private Property Rights 
Economic history also points to the confusion between private use rights and 
private property (ownership) rights as a form of the de-institutionalization that has 
blocked knowledge progress in African countries. In traditional African economies 
individuals can have private use rights to natural resources like land (classically 
defined); they cannot claim private ownership rights to nature‟s gifts to all people. 
A corn farmer and his/her descendants have only private use rights to the land they 
farm, but they have both private use rights and private ownership rights to the corn 
they grow on that land. Both use and ownership rights can be inherited privately, 
however only ownership rights can be exchanged privately. Private property rights 
are rights over resources that are the fruits of men‟s labor. Private ownership rights 
may or may not confer private use rights as in the case of the owner of an 
apartment complex who rents it. While renting it the renter cannot simultaneously 
use that same complex for his own private use. Conventional market theory lacks 
accommodation for these features of primitive economies. Instead, it assumes that 
either private use rights equal private ownership rights, or that the former is an 
element of the latter. Such a convention puts African countries at a disadvantage, 
resulting in a phenomenon Turnbull (1962) has named “the lonely African.”18 
Dalton (1962) shows that the failure of conventional economic theory to allow 
analytical space for Polanyi‟s “archaic institutions” to play their legitimate roles 
has had unfavorable implications for “traditional production in primitive African 
economies.” It is simply incorrect to allege that markets did not exist in traditional 
Africa, or that they were inefficient because of private use rights vis-a-vis private 
property rights.
19
 What is correct is that markets that existed were neither 
competitive nor dominant social organizations or sources of livelihoods. By 
extension, while the Solow-Swan-type aggregate production functions would 
describe the economic activity in any modern economy, they would not suffice for 
traditional economies which are characterized by multi-goals. In those economies, 
“neighboring societies sharing the same physical environment often produce 
markedly different ranges of output, with different technologies used within 
differently organized production groups” (Dalton, 1962, 364). Moreover, the 
production of goods and services is simultaneously the production of community, 
suggesting that the economic system is “embedded” in the social system and 
“functions as a by-product of noneconomic institutions” (p. 365, cf. Smelser, 
1965).   
Again, the aggregate production function itself is a universal rule. However, the 
allocation of resources it describes is economy-specific and influenced by 
economic behavior, organization, and control of that economy (cf. Amavilah, 
2010). Since “factor movements and appropriations are expressions of social 
obligations, social affiliation, and social rights, … [and] land utilization is 
organized differently from labor utilization” (p. 365), the principle of equi-
marginal products may not obtain and hold, in which case the primitive production 
function would be mis-specified. This interpretation ties in well with the distinction 
between private use rights and private ownership rights (cf. Dalton, 1962, pp. 365-
366). Consequently, the production process, to the extent that modern economic 
theory does not accommodate these special features,  disadvantages analysis of 
African economies. In fact, the switch from the real (traditional), to the imitation 
(modern) economy cannot be explained in terms of the conventional production 
possibilities frontier (PPF) model. Switching from traditional to modern production 
just means the PPF of non-traditional goods shifts rightward, and that of traditional 
goods shifts leftward, but there is no way of assessing inter-economy efficiency 
and the net welfare gains could actually have declined. Thus, the production of 
goods and services is really the production of community relationships, so that one 
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cannot dispose of such goods and services even if they have use rights to them 
without affecting reciprocity, redistribution, and all that. Moreover, calculating and 
comparing policy compensating and equivalent variations, and ascertaining the net 
gains across the two economies would be too complicated, if not impossible, to do. 
Conceptually, one can say that if the gains of new production possibilities are 
greater than the losses of old production possibilities, society has benefitted. 
However, that is not all, because “colonialism did not make Africans worse off 
materially; it destroyed culture and society of which the indigenous economy was 
and inextricable part. It destroyed materially poor but unusually integrated ways of 
life, wherein economic and social processes were mutually dependent and 
reinforcing. This is something on a different plane from simple material betterment 
or worsening. The destructive colonial impact consisted in forcing socio-economic 
change which was not meaningful to Africans in terms of their traditional 
societies” (p. 374ff, emphasis added). In concluding this subsection,  cannot help 
drawing attention to the following Dalton‟s rendition: 
We should not be overly eager to create in Africa an uncontrolled market 
idyll the blessing of which we so insistently deny ourselves. To Africans, the 
welfare state and policies of strong central control mean techniques for rapid 
economic development and political unification, which, at the same time, 
express social responsibility in accord with traditional usages (p. 378). 
Hoselitz (1960) has attributed to Frederich List a similar perspective that 
“growth can occur only in societies in which there is internal freedom, i.e., freedom 
of political organization and freedom of the individual [since] „it is vain that 
individuals are industrious, saving, intelligent, and inventive; free institutions are 
still needful for the proper application of the qualities, [as] history teaches, in fact, 
that individuals draw the greatest part of their productive power from social 
conditions and the institutions of society‟” (pp. 193-238). 
2.4. Overvaluing Foreign Knowledge and Undervaluing and Devaluing 
Local Knowledge 
Another social obstacle to technological progress of African countries is the 
undervaluing and devaluing of local knowledge and overvaluing of foreign 
knowledge. In the information and communication technology field, local area 
networks are essential, respected, and even revered. It does not make sense why 
human local networks about the same things in traditional societies are not valued 
the same way, in fact they are undervalued and devalued. Brush & Stabinsky 
(1996) make a convincing argument for the role of intellectual property rights in 
determining the value of local knowledge – a role that does not separate use rights 
from ownership rights. Using a sociological lens, Daniel Lee Kleinman (2005) may 
be correct is asserting that “science is political” while “technology is social” not 
only in the sense that the former mobilizes knowledge and the latter applies 
knowledge, but also that “technoscience” has facilitated colonialism and unequal 
resource distribution in developing countries as well as gender-biased stratification 
and meritocracy in science and engineering. But “development is freedom” (Sen, 
1999), not bondage. 
As mentioned above, when private property rights override private use rights, it 
is easy to see how traditional economies are understood as not having valuable 
local knowledge. The problem is that social values drive knowledge, and 
knowledge is fundamental to technological progress. Das & Kolack (2008) 
illustrate how values lead and sustain technological progress with study cases of 
pygmy, Eskimo, African, Indian, US, and Israeli economies. In all six cases the 
social origins and “cultural ramifications” of technological change are obvious. 
Moreover, such results are not really new since both in E.F. Schumacher‟s Small is 
Beautiful (1989[1973]) and Wilhelm Ropke‟s A Humane Economy (1960) society 
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is the canvas on which the economy is painted (cf. Amavilah, 2009b). This 
perspective is consistent with Richard S. Westfall‟s (1977) description of the 
mechanisms and mechanics leading to the “organization of the scientific 
enterprise” (Chapter 5). The latter has historical and sociological implications for 
“the construction of modern science” – the title of the book. 
2.5. Ignoring Art as an Expression of Technological Knowledge 
Art is the skill resulting from formal knowledge, practice, or both. There is no 
art without skill, meaning there is no art without science, technology, and 
engineering behind it. Art is applied science [and engineering]; it illustrates 
scientific principles.
20
 The denial of the scientific basis of art has disadvantaged 
African countries. To consume art, one has to produce art. To produce art one has 
to have the knowledge to do so.
21
 Also since knowledge is wealth, creating wealth 
is art, an idea common to Petty and others, according to Johnson (1965). From it, it 
is clear that the “Commonwealth” of a nation (W) is the sum of natural wealth (Wn) 
and artificial wealth (Wa), i.e., 
 
𝑊 = 𝑊𝑛 + 𝑊𝑎,        (4) 
 
where Wn is nature-given wealth such as natural resources and Wa is human-
made wealth (cf. Amavilah, 2005). So, if we assume that Wa is built by adding 
value to Wn, then over time W becomes 
 
𝑊 𝑡 = 𝑊𝑛 𝑡 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝑊𝑎 𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑡 .      (5) 
 
Eq. (5) suggests that Wn follows a logistic function while Wa  is exponential 
(potentially does not have a limit). Now, if we let𝑊𝑎 𝑡 =  𝛽 𝑊𝑛 𝑡 , 0 <  𝛽 < 1, 
then  
 
𝑊 𝑡 = 𝑊𝑛 𝑡 𝑒−𝑟𝑡 + 𝐵𝑊𝑛 𝑡 𝑒𝑎𝑡 =   1 + 𝐵 𝑊𝑛 𝑡  𝑒 𝑎−𝑟 𝑡 .  (6)
    (1) 
For r > α, W can only grow slowly as it depends largely on Wn. If r < α, Wa is 
growing faster than Wn, and both Wn  and Wa are declining if r = α. Essentially, 
creating wealth is an art based on knowledge, and the net rate of wealth creation is 
r – α (cf. Amavilah, 2005). 
2.6. Too Much Natural Resource Idleness 
Resource idleness is also the social obstacle which has plagued many African 
countries for many years. Re-interpreting Lewis (1965), Amavilah (2014a) points 
out that African leaders frequently overstress their countries‟natural wealth. 
However, historically natural resource-poor economies have done better than 
natural resource-rich economies, suggesting clearly that resources in-situ are 
essentially not resources. Hence, Fahm (1964) is not off the mark in his contention 
that “despite the fervent political nationalism found in many of the African states, 
Africa has not found a means to achieve economic nationalism” (p. 369). Indeed, 
as Johnson (1965) illustrates with examples of Britain during the pre-Smith era, 
idle resources do not lead to wealth unless put to productivity use.  Idle resoures 
are “a sign of indolence and lassitude [for] „it is not the vastness of territory, nor 
the multitude of men, but their address and industry which improve a nation‟” (p. 
282).
22
 The cost of resource idleness is the income loss of unemployment and the 
loss of wealth. Resources are necessary for Africa to rise; resource are not 
sufficient for Africa to rise as well as run.  
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2.7. Too Little Acknowledgment of Scarcity  
The obstacle of resource idleness is a failure, neglect, or refusal to acknowledge 
scarcity as a constraint and opportunity. Both Lewis (1965) and Johnson (1965) 
reveal that the gifts of nature (or is it Nature?), while certainly many, are still finite. 
National greatness comes from such gifts in combination with industry; it is 
industrious factors of production which create wealth, not money and the existence 
of natural resources. In other words, where factors of production are plentiful, as 
land is in most African countries, rent should be low, but if land is combined with 
industry, great things can happen, and great things did happen in other parts of the 
world. Thus, in justifying “The Will to Economize,” Lewis argues that 
growth is the result of human effort. Nature is not particularly kind to man; 
left to herself she will overwhelm with weeds, with floods, with epidemics 
and with other disasters which man wards off by taking thought and action. 
It is by accepting the varied challenges presented by his environment that 
man is able, in innumerable ways, to wrest from nature more product for 
less effort. [Moreover,] to accept the challenge of nature is to be willing to 
experiment, to seek out opportunities, to respond to openings, and generally 
to manoeuvre. The greatest growth occurs in societies where men have an 
eye to the economic chance, and are willing to stir themselves to seize it (p. 
23, emphasis and [...] added). 
Here, too, Amavilah (2014a) has interpreted Lewis as meaning that scarcity is 
good for economic efforts. Hence,  “... it makes a great difference to the rate of 
economic growth whether the rich spend their incomes on keeping retainers and on 
building monuments, or whether they invest it in irrigation works, or mines, or 
other productive activities. It is the habit of productive investment that 
distinguishes rich from poor nations, rather than differences in equality of income, 
or differences in the respect accorded to wealthy men. Again, in so far as there are 
differences in prestige attaching to wealth, what matters is the relative status of 
those whose wealth is made or represented by productive investment, as compared 
with those whose wealth springs from ownership or inheritance of land.  The really 
significant turning point in the life of a society is not when it begins to respect 
wealth, as such, but when it places in the forefront productive investment and the 
wealth associated therewith” (Lewis, 1965:28, italics added). Lewis is well aware 
that scarcity is not (should not be) a permanent curse, because  “... when we say 
that a country is rich in resources the statement has meaning only in relation to 
contemporary knowledge and techniques. Similarly, a country which is considered 
to be poor in resources today may be considered very rich in resources at some 
later time, not merely because unknown resources are discovered, but equally 
because new uses are discovered for the known resources” (p. 52).  Thus, Lewis is 
correct to conclude that “... there is no direct correlation, positive or negative, 
between resources and human behavior. Some people (countries) with superior 
resources make more effort than some with inferior resources; while some other 
people (countries) with inferior resources make more effort than some others with 
superior resources” (ib.) In the end the response to change depends neither on 
resources nor on innate intelligence. It depends on leadership; leadership is reared, 
not born, and relative to Asian countries, African countries have neglected 
investing in essential leadership (America, 2013). The neglect is an obstacle 
because we now know from Robert Lucas (1993) that the Asian miracle, for 
example, was in reality a man-made miracle (cf. Amavilah, 2014a; 2014b). 
2.8. Overstressing the Benefit of Luxury and Excessive Consumption 
Under conditions of poverty and inequality, luxury, or the unproductive time 
and effort expended to acquire it, is one of the obstacles to greater production, and 
probably one of the reasons Alfred Marshall “had propounded the view that the 
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very rich and the very poor were the ignoble elements of society – and both should 
be eliminated through the redistribution of wealth” (Pugh & Garrett, 2000:18). 
Luxury and extravaganza are “cancerous social diseases” (Johnson, 1965:290), and 
“excessive consumption was considered as the symptom of economic decay, [it is] 
an insatiable demand for exotic goods: luxury bred vanity, and vanity required 
foreign goods” (Johnson, 1965:291). Veblen‟s (1899) conspicious consumption 
theory reflects that belief (cf. Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996; James, 1987; Page, 
1992). African governments, especially during the socalled lost decades (1970s-
1980s), have indulged in outlandish consumption, masqueraded as public 
investment (cf. Amavilah, 2014a; Lewis, 1965). Poverty and inequality of income 
and wealth magnify the negative effects of luxury and excessive consumption on 
knowledge and knowledge growth of African countries. 
2.9 Factor Overcompensation? 
With all the poverty and income and wealth inequality in African countries, the 
idea that factors of production are overcompensated is probably one of the hardest 
for many in those countries to entertain. However, as Peter T. Bauer (2013) has 
argued factor overpayment in West Africa has been due to imperfect competition, 
especially monopoly and oligopoly. Chen (2010) offers alternative evidence with 
the study case of teachers in developing countries, which finds teachers‟ 
characteristics (age, education, experience, gender, etc.) and school levels 
(primary, secondary, and so on) to contribute significantly to teacher overpayment. 
The results are reasonable, because in most African countries teachers belong to 
unions and those unions are affiliated with dominant, often ruling, political parties. 
Hence, teachers‟ actual wage (salary) rates are higher than the equilibrium wage 
rate because they include a union membership premium. This perspective agrees 
with the classic study of Labor in Developing Economies in which Walter 
Galenson (1963) associates wage differentials with trade union power, market 
structure, and the conventional forces of demand and supply. Political power 
enhances union collective bargaining power. This is the classic case of the so-
called “bilateral monopoly” in that unionized workers act as a labor monopoly 
while the tertiary sector acts like a labor monopsony. 
Cavalcanti, and dos Santos (undated), and Mengistae (1998) examine the 
tertiary sector and reveal that government employees are paid a lot more than the 
opportunity cost of the skills they have – they collect huge economic rents. For 
example, in real terms, including benefits, a Permanent Secretary (a non-cabinet 
position) with only a bachelor‟s degree earns more than a medical doctor working 
for a government-owned hospital in the same country. In real purchasing power 
terms, senior ministers in some developing countries earn more than their 
counterparts in developed countries – several times more than the average value of 
the marginal product of labor in those countries. The „demonstration effect” 
through consumption goods, puts upward pressure on the prices of other goods and 
services. As wage rates increase, the quantity demanded of labor decreases, and in 
terms of performance, the difference is not made up by productivity improvement, 
which is constrained by capital and technology imports. Unemployment increases 
motivate idle slum dwelling, emigration of unskilled and semi-skilled workers to 
other countries, or both. Stated in the demand-supply framework, the 
demonstration effect tends to increase wages and to reduce employment (a 
movement leftward along the demand curve). With high unemployment some 
workers quit the domestic labor market, and the labor supply curve shifts leftward. 
Both the movement along the demand curve and the shift of the supply curve put 
upward pressure on wages.
23
 
In developing countries overcompensating public sector workers is a learned 
(inherited) aftereffect of colonialism and before. David R. Roediger (1991) has 
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explained the effect of race on wages in the U.S. South, and his study is relevant to 
other places that experience all kinds of wage discrimination on the basis of race. 
Abott Emerson Smith (1965) wrote eloquently about the difference between black 
slave and white servitude and convict labor in America. In both cases colonial 
officers were overpaid, and it is not surprising that those who came to replace them 
have done the same. However, research elsewhere shows public sector workers 
being overpaid in industrialized countries as well. For the USA, Allegretto & Keefe 
(2010) indicate that, including benefits, the private sector pays more than public 
sector workers with high school and some college education. Government tends to 
pay higher workers with associate and advanced degrees more than private firms 
do. Does this mean government values education more than the private sector? Are 
the less educated truly more productivity in the private sector than in the public 
sector? These matters are important for future investigations. What is clear from 
them all now is that African countries appear to have inherited these same 
contradictions, but for poor countries the cost of wrong policy are greater than they 
are for rich countries. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
Research on the economic growth and technological change of African 
countries has advance greatly from the problem descriptions of the 1930-1950s, 
and the political arguments of the 1960-1980s.
24
Although there have been 
significant variations across countries, in recent years Africa in general has risen at 
a faster pace than it has run forward, such that poverty and inequality of both 
income and wealth are still widespread. In their search to understand the deep 
causes of slow growth and change in African countries, economists have tended to 
overstress the importance of quantifiable economic factors.  Even more troubling is 
that the quantification has neglected the economic history of Africa so much that 
when historical events like the Atlantic Slave Trade, colonialism, or both are 
accounted for, the overall performance picture itself remains not quite complete as 
the descriptions are essentially pseudo-dynamic. 
This comment looks away from the conventional economic literature to claim 
that the deep causes of troubles can all be summarized as the de-institutionalization 
of traditional economies, making them adopt new institutions which put them at a 
huge disadvantage. Some of the elements of the de-institutionalization process are 
not easily quantifiable either because they are not directly observable, or simply 
because no data exists. The loss of traditional religions and religious leadership, for 
example, became a huge obstacle to growth and change. Religion is critical to 
social morality and to the understanding of the governance of economic problems 
like poverty and inequality. To understand the social foundation of technology 
from the perspective of economic history we need to study how historians view 
economic growth. History reveals that the weakening and disappearance of religion 
undermined social norms and values upon which economic behavior, organization, 
and control depend. We know that because economies that retained and were able 
to improve their traditional institutions have done well relative to their counterparts 
who lost all or most of their traditional institutions and had to start from scratch.  
It is easy to fall victim of the belief that traditional economies were 
unsophisticated and dull. History says otherwise; for example, “archaic economies” 
were clearly innovative in recognizing very early on that economies could be run 
on the basis of money with far less intrinsic value than gold/silver, and without 
decree. The failure to credit primitive economies for this technological invention is 
a form of the de-institutionalization which interrupted the growth and change of 
traditional economies. Moreover, modern economic theory is not better-off either, 
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because the failure to acknowledge this sophisticated theory of value, explains why 
some still today do not understand while electronic mobile banking is spreading 
fastest in the traditionally cattle raising regions of Africa like Kenya. If it built into 
its fabric the special features of traditional economies, modern economic theory 
would have been richer and better equipped than it is now to deal with a host of 
problems facing developing countries. This is important because social values 
drive knowledge, and knowledge is fundamental to technological progress.  
Another obstacles has been the resource idleness which has plagued many 
African countries for many years. The cost of resource idleness is the loss of 
income and wealth, which implies that resources are necessary for Africa to rise; 
resource are not sufficient for Africa to rise and run.  Moreover, closely allied with 
resource idleness is the neglect and/or refusal to acknowledge and confront 
scarcity. A successful response to scarcity depends neither on resources nor on 
innate intelligence. It depends on leadership, and relative to Asian countries, 
African countries have neglected investing in essential leadership. This is an 
obstacle because we now know that there are no such things as growth miracles – 
growth miracles observed in East Asian countries are all man-made miracles. 
Other obstacles we outline in this comment include that African governments, 
especially during the socalled lost decades (1970s-1980s), have indulged in 
outlandish consumption masqueraded as domestic public investment, while 
“begging” for foreign aid at the same time. The demonstration effect of excessive 
consumption was inflated factor prices. But as consumption increased, given rising 
factor prices, investment fell. Hence, economies came to rely on the public sector. 
In developing countries overcompensation of public sector workers is a learned 
(inherited) afteraffect of colonialism and before.  
How does one demonstrate that the de-institutionalization evidenced by the few 
obstacles outlined here did actually disrupt the progress of African countries? One 
can use a metaphor from foundation engineering. An economy is structure. As a 
structure it consists of the the substructure and superstructure. The two are held 
together by some kind of infrastructure. A foundation connects the economic 
structure to society. The social obstacles outlined here destroyed (weakened) the 
foundation and the economic structure collapsed (wobbled), leaving society the 
sufferer from the heavy load. Consequently, attempts to rebuild the economic 
structure either without a foundation, or with a new foundation foreign to society 
have had understandably limited success. 
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Notes 
 
2Here is an admirable blurp on the back cover of Shinnie about “the savage myth” that reads like this: 
“During the period of rampant European colonialism that began in the 16th century, the commonly 
held and self-justifying Western view of Africa was that it was a barbaric land, devoid of culture 
and civilization. Gradually, however, in the light of increasing historical knowledge, this myth is 
being dispelled.” 
3A take from Chinua Achebe‟s hugely successful novel Things Fall Apart (1958). 
4 Even though it is common practice, personally I think that since God (Nature) is a constant, it is 
analytically futile to explain a variable (growth) with a constant.  
5I mean that Africa is the most Christianized and Islamized region in the world. 
6It is interesting to note that socialism and communism grew out of the German utopian New 
Christianity as was espoused by Wilhelm Weitling in his book  (Real Man and Ideal Man), written 
for the League of the Just. The book outlined “the guiding principles of a „property coownership 
system‟” (Ching-yao Ying, 1991, p. 1). Although The Communist Manifesto called for the “workers 
of the world to unite,” according to Marx and Engels‟s historical materialism, non-violent class 
struggles guaranteed automatic evolution towards socialism and Communism. Weitling was among 
the first to call for the violent overthrow of capitalism and for “denying food to the idle” (Ying, 
1991, p. 2).  
7W.A. Lewis‟s Bibliographical Note (1965, pp. 55-56) is illuminating. 
8See [Retrieved from]. 
9See [Retrieved from]. and [Retrieved from]. 
10In the USA the economies of, say, Disneyland/Disney Sea World and the City of Las Vegas (NV) 
are based on the production and distribution of “magic” which clearly satisfies consumer demand 
irrespective of religious underpinnings. 
11I strongly recommended Lewis‟s (1965) Bibliographical Note (pp. 162-163). 
12Note that (1)-(3) are not math relations; instead, they represent the hierarchical structure of a 
monetary system. In the USA, for example, the foundation is money (M), officially measured as 
M1, M2, and so on. The middle are banks, thrift institutions, and money mutual funds(FIP). The top 
is the Federal Reserve System (FIG). Our definition of FIG is loose here; we know that even though 
the Fed is governmental in its functions, its regional member banks are private. So, the Fed is really 
quasi-public or quasi-private depending on one‟s preference. 
13I am using the word “need” purposely in contrast to either “demand” or “quantity demanded”.  
14Surely the Eurozone would not have survived a sudden introduction of the Euro currency that would 
have devalued to zero national currencies, and this is why national-to-Euro currency exchange rates 
were worked out first, sufficient time allowed for adjustment, and even permitted the right of 
refusal to join the Eurozone, and the UK and Norway are still exercising their right to their national 
currencies.  
15There are very good references to Alfred Marshal on money in this edition, but I did not pursue 
them. 
16From outside the primitive economy a bride is bought; from inside the bride price is reciprocity, 
defined by Polanyi and Herskovits as “mutual assistance and cooperation”. Foreign aid from the 
industrialized countries to developing countries would remain partially effective for overlooking 
reciprocity among equals. Ashraf, Bau, Nunn, & Voena‟s, et al. (2014) study is very strong in its 
mathematical and econometric emphasis, but is does not seem to be aware of the work by economic 
anthropologists on this subject. 
17It is indeed a normative stance to tell people who they should be rather than ask and accept who 
they say they are.  
18This duality between modernity and tradition Hoselitz (1952) argued is one of the noneconomic 
obstacles to economic development of traditional economies. 
19Unlike in Karl Marx‟s historical materialism where capitalism grows out of feudalism, JR Hicks 
insists that exchange and markets rose long before capitalism. 
20It is good that many universities still consider mathematics, as opposed to mathematical sciences, an 
art.  
21Hence, T. Haavelmo (1960) is correct in stressing that producing knowledge is simultaneously 
consuming knowledge (cf. Amavilah, 2014c). 
22The single quotation marks refer to Johnson citing John Evelyn; I have not read Evelyn. 
23William Easterly & Yaw Nyarko (2008) are correct that the growth dampening effect (cost) of 
emigration on the home country is potentially higher for unskilled and semi-skilled workers than it 
is for high skilled (human capitalized) workers. In this sense the brain drain argument is a farce. 
24I have in mind, generally speaking, the independence politics of the late 1950s-1960s; neo-colonial 
and post-colonial politics of 1960s-1970s; and the World Bank/IMF politics of structural reforms in 
late 1980s-mid-1990s.  
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